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In studying the determination of exchange rates, theorists have tradi-
tionally relied on models of a two-country world, often further simplified
by the assumption that one of the countries is "small" relative to the
other. The two oil shocks of the 1970s, however, confronted the interna-
tional financial system with disturbances of an essentially multilateral
nature. When we speak of the effect of the price of oil on the exchange
rate, it is not the dollar rate but the dollar-mark or dollar-yen rate that we
have in mind. That is, we are concerned with the effects on a bilateral rate
of the actions of a third party, OPEC.
The "small-country" approach is particularly misleading when applied
to an oil shock. At first sight it might seem obvious that for an oil
importing country a rise in the price of oil leads to currency depreciation;
after all, its direct effect is to worsen the balance of payments. But
suppose the world consisted of several "symmetric" oil importers and
OPEC—that is, the oil importers accounted for equal shares of world oil
demand, equal shares of OPEC spending, etc. Then surely an oil price
increase would leave exchange rates among the oil importing countries
unchanged. How can this be? The reason is that while an oil price
increase directly worsens an oil importer's balance of payments, it in-
directly improves it as OPEC spends its increased income on purchases of
goods or assets. It is not enough to know that a country imports oil and
that its import demand is inelastic; we must know that it has relatively
high import dependence, or relatively inelastic demand, or receives a
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relatively small share of OPEC spending, before we can be sure that its
currency depreciates when the price of oil goes up.
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To model the exchange rate effects of an oil shock, then, it is necessary
to work with a world containing at least two oil importing countries and
OPEC, and to systematically allow for asymmetries between the oil
importers. In this paper I make an effort in this direction. Three related
three-region models are developed. The first is a trade balance model, in
which it is assumed that OPEC immediately spends all of its income. This
model develops the basic theme that asymmetries determine the direc-
tion of exchange rate movement. The second model sacrifices some detail
on trade balance determination, but opens the world to capital flows,
allowing OPEC to adjust its spending only gradually after the oil price
rises. The main point here is the interplay between "real" and "financial"
asymmetries, which may push the exchange rate in different directions.
Finally, the third model simplifies the asset markets but introduces
"rational" speculation.
8.2 A Trade Balance Model
Consider a world containing three countries: America, Germany, and
OPEC. America and Germany export manufactured goods to OPEC and
to each other; OPEC exports oil and imports manufactures.
The bilateral trade balance between America and Germany, measured
in dollars, depends on the mark price of the dollar:
(1) T=T(V).
In both America and Germany, oil imports depend on the domestic
currency price of oil:
(2) 0A = 0A(P0),
(3) OG = OG(V-PO),
where Po is the dollar price of oil. We assume elasticities of demand eA,
eG < 1. Also, it will be useful to use the notation O - OA + OG for world
oil imports, and cr = OG/O for the German share of world oil imports.
OPEC will be assumed to fix the price of oil in dollars and to spend all
of its income, dividing this expenditure between American and German
products. Letting XG, XA be the exports to OPEC, we have
(4) XG
(5) XA = [l-y(V)]Po0,
where y is the share of OPEC expenditure falling on German exports.
1. Papers on the exchange rate implications of an oil shock in a small-country framework
include Findlay and Rodriguez (1977), Buiter (1978). and Obstfeld (1980). A three-country
simulation model is developed by Sachs (1982).261 Oil Shocks
Notice that there is a difference in the treatment of the industrial
countries and OPEC. The trade flows of the industrial countries are
determined by partial equilibrium, "elasticity" equations, while OPEC's
imports depend explicitly on income. The main reason for this difference
in treatment is simplicity—income effects in OPEC play a clear and
crucial role in our story; income effects in the industrial countries, while
readily introduced, add complication without changing much. It may also
be defended as an empirical approximation that OPEC's marginal pro-
pensity to import manufactures is much higher than its customers' mar-
ginal propensity to spend on oil; so income effects on the OPEC side will
be much more noticeable.
Given this simple structure, then, we can solve for the exchange rate.
Germany's balance of trade is
(6) BG = T(V) + XG-Po0H,
and we assume dBG/dV>0, which is the Marshall-Lerner condition for
this model. If there are no capital movements, the exchange rate is
determined by the condition
(7) BG = 0.
Consider now the effect of an increase in the price of oil. After some
manipulation, this can be shown to be
dVldPo = - (dBG/dVy
 lO- [7<r(l - eG) + 7
(8
) -cr(l-6G)].
The sign of this depends on whether a ^7, where
- eG) + (1 - CT)(1 - eA)
Now a contains three sorts of parameters. The parameter CT is Germany's
share of world oil imports; eG, eA are elasticities of demand for oil; 7 is
Germany's share of world exports to OPEC. It can be interpreted as
Germany's share of the increase in world spending on oil when its price
increases. If Germany's share of OPEC imports is more than its share of
the marginal oil payments burden, the mark will appreciate; if it is less,
the mark will depreciate.
If elasticities of demand were the same, the expression would reduce to
a simple comparison of shares: 7^0-. Countries which are relatively
oil-dependent will tend to have depreciation after an oil shock; countries
which are relatively successful at selling to OPEC tend to have apprecia-
tion. But it is important to note that success at reducing oil imports will
also matter. The elasticity of import demand exerts a first-order effect on
the exchange rate response.
This simple model already reveals several determinants of the ex-
change rate effects of an oil shock. It does, however, miss a crucial aspect262 Paul Krugman
of the actual experience of the 1970s, the enormous recycling of oil
revenues through international financial markets. OPEC did not im-
mediately increase its imports to match its increased export revenue, so
that it is necessary to introduce this lag, and the corresponding capital
flows, into the model.
8.3 Capital Flows and Dynamics
8.3.1 Structure of the Model
Let us retain the basic structure of the last model, but introduce the
possibility of capital movements. These will be assumed to be two inter-
nationally traded assets, marks and dollars, that is, the currencies of the
oil importers. Also, OPEC will adjust its spending to its income with a
lag. This will give rise to some dynamic complications, because the
burden of oil payments may not fall where OPEC wants to invest, nor will
investment and import spending be divided in the same proportion
between the oil importers.
We begin with the goods markets. The determination of the America-
Germany trade balance is the same as before. OPEC, however, is now
assumed to adjust its spending to its income only with a lag, assumed to
take the simple form
(10) X=\(Po0-X),
where X is OPEC dollar expenditure.
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As before, OPEC allocates this expenditure between American and
German products:
(11) XG = y{V)X,
(12) XA = [1 - -y(V)]X.
Turning now to the asset markets, each country allocates its wealth
between dollars and marks. We will treat these markets in the same way
as we treated trade flows: that is, partial equilibrium equations for the oil
importers; explicit consideration of wealth effects for OPEC. The jus-
tifications are also the same. First, this simplification brings out the main
points with a minimum of complication. Second, in reality OPEC has a
much higher marginal propensity to hold wealth in foreign assets than the
oil importing countries, so that the theoretical simplification can also be
defended as an empirically valid approximation.
We assume, then, following Kouri (1982), that America holds in its
portfolio a fixed dollar value of marks, and that Germany holds a fixed
mark value of dollars:
2. It would be more reasonable to assume that it is OPEC's real expenditure which lags
behind income; but this complicates the exposition without changing the results.263 Oil Shocks
(13) DG = HG/V,
(14) MA = HA-V.
OPEC allocates its dollar wealth Wo in fixed proportions between
dollars and marks:
(15) Mo = aWo-V,
(16) Do = (l-a)Wo.
Our next step is to consider balance of payments. First, the current
accounts of the three countries may be written as follows:
(17) BG = T(V) + XG-Po0G,
(18) BA= -T(V)+XA-POOA,
(19) Bo = Po0-X.
A crucial variable is the rate of wealth accumulation by OPEC. This is
not simply the OPEC current account, because it also includes capital
gains and losses from changes in the exchange rate:
(20) W0 = B0-aW0(V/V).
The second step is to consider capital accounts. The German capital
account is sales of marks to America and OPEC, less German purchase of
dollars:
(21) KG = Mo/V + MAIV — DG,
or, substituting,
(22) KG = <xBo + [MAIV +DG + a(l - a)Wo]V/V.
A similar expression may be derived for the American capital account.
8.3.2 The Dynamic System
We can now derive the equation of change for the exchange rate. The
balance of payments must balance; thus we must have
or, from (22),
(23) V/V=-
 Bo + «BO
MA/V+DG + a(l-a)Wo
This expression has a natural interpretation. The numerator is what we
might call an ex ante balance of payments, that is, it is what Germany's
balance of payments would be if the exchange rate did not change. The ex
ante balance of payments includes not only the German current account,
but also that part of OPEC's current account which is recycled into264 Paul Krugman
marks. A surplus or deficit in the ex ante balance requires that the
exchange rate change to induce offsetting capital flows as investors reallo-
cate their portfolios. The denominator determines the extent of exchange
rate change needed; it may be read as an index of the size of the
international investment pool.
The dynamics of the exchange rate may now be determined. For a
given price of oil, the state of the world may be summarized by the
exchange rate and the level of OPEC spending, whose laws of motion are
determined by (10) and (23). The resulting dynamic system is illustrated
in figure 8.1.
The schedule X = 0 represents points where OPEC income and ex-
penditure are equal. For simplicity, we will assume that demand elastici-
ties for oil are zero. This means that world oil imports, and hence OPEC
income, are independent of the exchange rate; thus X— 0 is a vertical
line. To the right, expenditure exceeds income and is falling; to the left,
expenditure falls short of income and is rising.
The schedule VIV = 0 represents points where Germany's (and Amer-
ica's) ex ante balance of payments is zero. For reference we also show the
loci where America's and Germany's current accounts are zero. The
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The implication is that, in general, neither country's current account
determines the direction of exchange rate change. Thus at point R
America runs a current account surplus, yet the dollar is falling; at S
America runs a current account deficit, yet the dollar is rising. The only
situation in which a country's current account is related one-to-one with
VIV is when OPEC does not hold that country's currency. Thus when
OPEC holds no marks, a = 0, the line VIV - 0 coincides with BG = 0;
when OPEC holds no dollars, a = 1; it coincides with BA = 0.





Fig. 8.1 The dynamic system.
8.3.3 Effects of an Oil Price Increase
Suppose now that the price of oil goes up. In the short run this will
create ex ante payment imbalances, forcing gradual appreciation or
depreciation of the dollar which generates offsetting capital flows. In the
long run the exchange rate must be such as to produce current account
balance.
The short-run effect is easily computed from (23):
(27) (<r-a)O d{VIV) _
dPo MA/V+DG + a(l-a)Wo
Thus the mark will initially depreciate or appreciate depending on
whether Germany's share of world oil imports is more or less than the
share of marks in OPEC's portfolio. This makes obvious sense. The
effect of an oil price increase in the short run is directly to worsen
Germany's ex ante balance of payments via increased spending on oil,
but indirectly to improve it via recycled oil revenues (since OPEC ex-
penditure is fixed in the short run, there is no impact effect on Germany's
exports).
The long-run effect—after OPEC's spending has risen to match its266 Paul Krugman
income, so that Bo - 0—may be determined by the condition of current
account balance:
dV (28)
Again, this makes intuitive sense. In the long run, recycling has ended.
The direct burden of higher oil prices is now offset by the indirect benefit
of increased exports to OPEC; whether the mark depreciates or appreci-
ates in the long run depends on whether Germany's share of world oil
imports is more or less than its share of exports to OPEC.
Interestingly, the short-run and the long-run effects can run in opposite
directions. Suppose that 7>a>a—loosely speaking, OPEC prefers
American investments and German products. Then initially the dollar
V X=0
V/V = O
Fig. 8.2 The effect of a rise in the price of oil.267 Oil Shocks
must appreciate, but in the long run it must be below its original level.
The dynamics of this process are illustrated in figure 8.2. Point A repre-
sents the initial equilibrium, point B, the new long-run equilibrium. The
dollar at first appreciates; then, as OPEC's spending rises and exports of
goods become more important relative to exports of assets, the dollar
declines past its original level.
This is a simply, plausible story. But there is a major question which
immediately arises. If the dollar is going to depreciate in the long run,
won't this be expected? And won't this expectation tend to make the
dollar depreciate in the short run as well? Clearly the next step must be to
introduce speculation into the model.
8.4 Speculation: A Perfect Foresight Model
Speculation can fundamentally alter the results of the last model. If
asset demands are affected by the expected rate of change of the ex-
change rate, and these expectations take long-run factors into account,
long-run "real" factors may dominate short-run "financial" ones, even at
the outset.
To study the effect of expectations, we will consider a model which
makes further simplifications on both the goods and asset markets. First,
we replace the gradual adjustment of OPEC expenditure in (10) with a
step function. Suppose the price of oil is increased at time t0. We assume
that OPEC expenditure remains constant until time t() + T, then rises
immediately to equal income. Letting Xo be the original level of expendi-
ture, and Xx the new level, we have
X = X(), t<to+T,
On the asset side, we now assume that dollars are the only traded asset.
Thus OPEC holds only dollars; America holds no marks. Germany holds
dollars; the mark value of dollars it demands is assumed to depend
positively on the expected rate of dollar appreciation,
(30) DC = HG(U)/V.
We next assume that, except at the instant of the oil shock, expecta-
tions are characterized by perfect foresight:
(31) U = V/V.
These assumptions make it possible to analyze the effects of an oil
shock in a two-dimensional phase plane, even though there are really
three state variables—DG, V, and X. The method will be to analyze the
dynamic system in DG and V, holding A'constant; then to introduce the
effects of an anticipated change in X. For when the price of oil rises, X
initially does not change; but it is known that it will rise Tperiods later.268 Paul Krugman
Let us begin with the dynamic system holding X constant. The rate of
change of DG is simply the German current account:
(32) t)G — T(V) + y(V)X- P00G.
Since X and Po are held constant, the locus DG = 0 is a horizontal line in
(V, DG) space, as shown in figure 8.3.
Next, equations (30) and (31) imply an equation for VIV of the form
(33) = f{DG-V),
with/' >0. Thus VIV = 0 is a downward sloping line. The small arrows
indicate the laws of motion. As the representative paths indicate, the
system is saddlepoint unstable.
An increase in the price of oil changes these laws of motion twice. First,
there is an unanticipated shift in the DG = 0 schedule at the time of the oil
shock. Second, it can be anticipated the DG - 0 will shift again Tperiods
later, when OPEC expenditure rises to match its higher income. The first
shift must be an upward movement in DG = 0, since the rise in the price of
oil worsens Germany's current account at any given exchange rate. Later,
when OPEC expenditure rises, DG = 0 shifts back down; if 7 > a, it shifts
past its original position, so that the equilibrium involves a lower V than
Dr, =0
v/v = o
Fig. 8.3 Dynamics in the perfect foresight model.269 Oil Shocks
V/V = 0
Fig. 8.4 Examples of possible paths toward the saddle path.
the initial one. We will impose the "no speculative bubbles" assumption
that the system does eventually converge to the long-run equilibrium; this
closes the system.
Figure 8.4 illustrates two possible paths. Point A is the initial equilib-
rium position. After an oil shock, the schedule DG = 0 first shifts up, for T
periods, then moves down to below A, so that the new long-run equilib-
rium is at F. The unique stable path of the long-run dynamic system is
indicated by SF. If the world is to converge to Fat time t0 + T, it must have
reached a point on SF.
Until time t0 + T, the system follows the laws of motion implied by the
initial level of OPEC expenditure. Two ways in which these laws can put
the world onto SF are illustrated by BD and CE. The dollar may either
appreciate or depreciate when the price of oil increases. The subsequent
paths are illustrated against time in figure 8.5. The economic intuition
behind these cases is as follows. In one case the financial asymmetry
between the countries—the fact that OPEC recycles its surplus into270 Paul Krugman
t ime
Fig. 8.5 Two possible patterns.
dollars—leads to an initially rising dollar. But the expected gradual rise
makes dollars more attractive, so that there is a step jump. Eventually,
however, the long-run factors lead to an expectation of a depreciating
dollar, pulling the dollar down even before the end of OPEC recycling. In
the other case, these long-run factors dominate from the start. Although
OPEC recycles into dollars, the expectation of future dollar depreciation
is enough to produce a step drop in the exchange rate.
Which path will the exchange rate follow? The crucial point is that the
system must arrive at the stable path at just the right time. In figure 8.4,
BD takes a longer time than CE, because the required fall in German
dollar holdings is larger, yet the German current account deficit is smaller
(because V is larger). For each initial jump in V there is a corresponding
length of time needed to reach SF; the right initial V is that value for
which the time to SF is exactly T periods. It is also immediately obvious
that the direction of the initial exchange rate movement depends on T,
that is, the more quickly OPEC adjusts its spending, the more likely it is
that the dollar's long-run real disadvantage will outweigh its short-run
financial advantage.271 Oil Shocks
8.5 Summary
In this paper I have set out three closely related models of the effect of
an oil shock on exchange rates. The first model emphasized real factors:
the shares of countries in imports from and exports to OPEC and the
elasticity of demand for oil. The second model emphasized financial
factors: in the short run, when OPEC runs a surplus, it matters where
they invest it. The third model emphasized the dependence of the finan-
cial side on the real side through expectations.
These models represent highly oversimplified representations of the
factors at work. They do, however, give some suggestive guidance. And
they make clear a point which is too easily overlooked in models which at
first sight may seem more realistic and sophisticated: namely, that an oil
shock affects all countries, and its exchange rate effects must arise from
asymmetries between countries. They cannot be determined by consider-
ing each country in isolation.
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Comment Pentti J. K. Kouri
Paul Krugman's excellent paper is concerned with the short-run and
long-run effects of oil shocks in a three-country (U.S., Germany, and
OPEC) partial equilibrium balance of payment model. My comments will
be mainly concerned with issues and problems that he does not discuss or
assumes away for reasons of convenience. The thrust of my comment is
that Krugman's partial equilibrium, "elasticities" approach to the oil
transfer problem leaves out effects that may be of first-order importance.
I do think, however, that what Krugman does is extremely useful as a step
toward a more comprehensive analysis of global adjustment to oil price
disturbances.
Oil Price and the Exchange Rate
Section 8.2 develops a familiar partial equilibrium trade balance model
to study the effect of an exogenous increase in the dollar price of oil on the
dollar-mark exchange rate, ceteris paribus. In this analysis, Krugman
assumes that macroeconomic policies in the United States and Germany
keep U.S. and German prices and output levels unchanged despite the oil
shock. He also assumes that OPEC supply of oil adjusts to the demand
for oil at the exogenously given dollar price. Given these assumptions,
the dollar-mark exchange rate has to adjust following an oil shock in such
a way as to keep the German, or equally the U.S. trade balance equal to
zero.
The effect of an increase in the dollar price of oil on the German trade
balance consists of two parts. First, there is an increase in oil import
payments, assuming realistically that the price elasticity of oil demand is
less than one. This effect is equal to -OGPa{\ - eG)Fo, where OG is the quantity of German oil imports, Po the dollar price of oil, and eG is the
price elasticity of German oil demand and the caret denotes proportional
change. The second effect of an oil price increase on the German trade
balance is an increase in OPEC demand for German exports. This effect
is equal to -yOP0[(l - eG)a + (1 - eA) (1 - (J)]P0, where a is Germany's share of world oil imports, and eA is price elasticity of American oil
demand. The net effect on the German balance of trade is accordingly
[7(1 - CT) (1 - e) - (1 - 7)CT(1 - eG)]P0OP0. If the demand elasticities
are the same in the two countries, this expression simplifies into (7 — cr)
(1 — e) P0OP0, so that an increase in the price of oil improves the ex ante
German trade balance if Germany's share of world oil imports is less than
its share of OPEC's imports from industrial countries. An increase in the
German oil demand elasticity relative to the American oil demand elas-
Pentti J. K. Kouri is a professor in the Department of Economics at New York University
and a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research.273 Oil Shocks
ticity has the same effect as a reduction in German "oil dependence" as
measured by a.
Given a change in the ex ante German trade balance, the dollar-mark
rate has to adjust in such a way as to offset it. A depreciation of the mark
has three effects on the German trade balance in Krugman's model. First,
it improves Germany's trade balance with the United States, provided
that the bilateral Marshall-Lerner condition holds. In an initial situation
of equilibrium, this effect is equal to EGAPG/V (r\A + r\G - 1), where EGAPG /Vis the dollar value of German exports to the United States; and
T|A and r\G are U.S. and German import price elasticities. The second
effect is a change in OPEC demand for German exports. This is equal to
yOP0 (r\o - 1), where -no is the price elasticity of OPEC's demand for
German exports. The third effect is a reduction in German oil imports
induced by the increase in the mark price of oil. The net effect of this
change on the German balance of trade is (1 - 7) 0GPoeG. The sum of
these three effects is equal to
EPGIV [eGA (TU + TnG - i) + eooCno - i) + (i - 7)eoG*G]v,
where 0GA(9GO) is the share of U.S. (OPEC) in total German exports,
9oG is the ratio of the value of oil imports to total German exports, and
EPG/Vis the dollar value of German exports. Stability requires that the
total exchange rate effect on the trade balance be positive.
From the above, the effect of an increase in the dollar price of oil on the




A = eGA(^A + -no - i) + eGo (tio -1) + (1 - 7)
This is a useful formula, but we have to be careful in applying it. I shall
next discuss the many qualifications that one must keep in mind when
interpreting this equation and the conclusions drawn from it.
Introducing Income Effects
Krugman's analysis of the oil transfer problem is reminiscent of
Keynes's analysis of the German reparations problem. Like Keynes, he
assumes away the direct effect of the oil transfer payment on U.S. and
German imports.
With allowance for income effects, the trade balance equilibrium con-
dition (for Germany or the United States) is given by:
(2) BG = DG[V, XA(1 - 8APO)]/V - D2[V, XG (1 + D°G(V,OPo)/V-bGXGPo = 0,274 Paul Krugman
where V = ePA/PG is the relative price of U.S. and German products
which equals the "real" dollar-mark exchange rate; Po is the "real" price
of oil in terms of U.S. output, and 5A(8G) is the ratio of U.S. (German) oil
consumption to U.S. (German) gross output. I shall assume for simplicity
that oil demand elasticities are equal to zero so that 5A(8G) are fixed
parameters.
From equation (2) the effect of an increase in the price of oil on the ex
ante German trade balance is equal to:
(3) dBG = OP0 KG - CTTTG - (1 - a) TTG ] Po,
where TTG is OPEC's marginal propensity to import from Germany (= 7
in Krugman's model), 7TG is Germany's marginal propensity to spend on
German output, irG is the U.S. marginal propensity to import from
Germany, and a is Germany's share in world imports. This expression
brings out the importance of differences in marginal spending propen-
sities between the three regions—a point emphasized by Ohlin in his
debate with Keynes. If the marginal propensity to spend on German
output is the same in the three regions, that is, if TTG - TTG = ^G*
 tn
e
effect of an oil price increase on the German ex ante trade balance is zero,
irrespective of relative oil dependence as measured by cr. In that special
case neither Germany nor the United States has to suffer a secondary
burden in the form of terms of trade deterioration. Krugman assumes
that TT§ = 1 and TTG = 0, in which case the effect of an oil price increase on
the terms of trade depends only on the sign of (TTG - a) as discussed
above.
The effect of (real) devaluation or revaluation, ceteris paribus, de-
pends also on differences in marginal spending propensities. Assuming
"representative individuals" in each of the three regions, we can use the
Slutsky decomposition to obtain the following expression for the effect of
devaluation on the German trade balance:
(4) dBG = (e
G + 9G TTG + e°G < + (eg - l)Trg) (XG/V) V,
where
e = 0G eG + 6G eG + 6G eG ,
and 0G is the share of German output absorbed by region /, and eG is the
Hicksian compensated elasticity of demand for German output, / = A,
O, G. If all the marginal spending propensities are the same, the effect of
real depreciation of the mark on the German trade balance, ceteris
paribus, depends only on the weighted average of compensated price
elasticities of demand for German output and is therefore unambiguously
positive. The failure of the Marshall-Lerner condition is thus intimately
connected with differences in marginal spending patterns. In particular,
the Marshall-Lerner condition is likely to fail when (1) the compensated
price elasticities are low and (2) domestic marginal propensity to spend
on domestic output (TTG) is high relative to the foreign marginal propen-275 Oil Shocks
sities to spend on domestic output (TTG and TTG). In such a case the income
effect of an increase in the price of domestic output causes a shift of world
demand toward domestic output which may more than offset the substitu-
tion effect that works in the opposite direction.
From equations (3) and (4), the effect of an oil price increase on the
dollar-mark exchange rate is:
o G /i ™\_A /"ID
,C\ ,", TTG ~ C^G ~~ I
1 ~~ OV^G
 U"o A
I 2J 1 y = /-*
Note that spending propensities appear both in the numerator and in
the denominator. The greater the bias of demand toward domestic output
(as measured by ITG and (1 - TTG )), the greater the exchange rate impact
of an oil price increase, and the higher the probability that the Marshall-
Lerner condition fails. Krugman's formula is a special case of (5) with TTG
equal to one and TTG equal to zero.
Introducing Interest Income and Capital Movements
Next we introduce exogenous capital movements and interest earnings
on holdings of foreign assets. For this purpose we need the following
notation: FAG is the stock of German mark-denominated bonds held by
Americans in the units of German output. FA% is the stock of American-
dollar denominated bonds held by Germans in the units of U.S. output.
FA°G is the stock of American dollar-denominated bonds held by OPEC
in the units of U.S. output. RA(RG) is the U.S. (German) real interest
rate in terms of U.S. (German) output. CF) - A FA) is the capital flow
from region i to region /.
The German balance of payments equilibrium condition is now given
by:
(6) BG + (RA FA£ - RG FAGIV - RG FA°G IV)
+ (CF£IV + C¥GIV - CF^) = 0.
The trade account, BG, is determined by:
(7) BG = DG (V, YA)IV-D
GA{V, YG) + D°G(V, Yo)IV-bGXG Po,
where Y{ is the total expenditure in region / in the units of U.S. output,
and:
(8a) YA = XA (1 - 5APo) + RG FAGIV - RA FA° - RA FA°A
(8b) YG = XG(±- 8GPO) + RAFAA - RGFAGIV
- RG FA'c IV - CF£ + CF£ IV + CFGIV.
(8c) Yo = (8A XA + 5G XG) Po + RA ¥A\ + RG FA
lG - CF
lA - CF
lG IV.276 Paul Krugman
From equations (6), (7), and (8) the effect of a devaluation of the mark
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As before, 0G is the share of German output consumed in region /. TG is
the "capital transfer" from region i to Germany as a fraction of German
output; thus T£ = CF£/XG and 7°G = CF^/^G- aG is the share of Ger-
man mark income received by residents of region /; thus aG = RA FAG /
XG; aG=l-RG (FAG + FA°G)/XG; and a°G = RG FA°G/ZG. An interesting and important implication of this equation is that if each
region completely hedges its import payments and purchases of foreign
assets, the income effects wash out, and the Marshall-Lerner condition
must hold without ambiguity. As an example, consider the United States
in the model. It imports German products in the amount DG and buys
German assets at the rate of CFG, which we take to be exogenous.
Therefore, an increase in the relative price of German products (1/F)
reduces U.S. real income by (DG + CFG)/V in the units of U.S. income
and increases German real income by the same amount. To hedge
themselves against the possibility of such changes in real income, U.S.
residents could borrow in U.S. dollars and invest in German marks to
earn real income in Germany equal to their purchases of German imports
and assets. With RG FAG equal to DG + CFG, American real income, and also German real income, is unaffected by marginal changes in the
terms of trade.
Apart from borrowing and lending, hedging could be achieved through
the forward market. Thus U.S. residents could buy German marks
forward at the rate of DG + CFG per unit of time, and be completely
hedged against changes in V.
Hedging by means of borrowing and lending in dollars and marks, or
by means of forward market transactions, is possible, however, only if
domestic currency prices of German and U.S. products are stable. Only
in that case will a German mark bond, for example, represent a "real
claim" on German output.
Consider now the short-run effect of an increase in the price of oil and
the associated change in capital movements on the German balance of
payments, ceteris paribus. From equations (6), (7), and (8) we obtain:
(10) dBG = KG - (nrg - (1 - a) TTG] OPO Po
CF
(i)
- T7°G) dCF°G/V.277 Oil Shocks
The first term is exactly the same as before. The second term represents
the effect of a change in bilateral capital flows between Germany and the
United States: a net inflow of capital to Germany improves Germany's
balance of payments, ceteris paribus, only if German marginal propensity
to spend on German output is greater than U.S. marginal propensity to
spend on German output. The last two terms represent the net effects of
changes in OPEC investments in the two countries. Again, what matters
are the differences in marginal spending propensities. It is illuminating to
rewrite equation (10) in a slightly different form:
(11) dBG = - aOPo Po + dC¥°G IV + (77°G + TT£) {<JOP0 PO - dCF°G IV) a) OPOPO - dCF°A]
^IV-dCF^)^ (TT°G - irg) dB°G
°A + (Tig - 77G) dBG .
The term -aOP0P0 + dCF^IV represents the impact effect of an oil
price increase on the German balance of payments: an increase in the cost
of oil imports minus the increase in capital flow from OPEC to Germany.
To obtain the net effect on the German balance of payments we have to
add the increase in OPEC imports from Germany and the reduction in
German imports from the United States. This is the second term. If
1
7 G + ^A = 1, or TT-Q = 1 - TT
G = irg, the secondary effect offsets the
primary effect and the German balance of payments remains unaffected.
The third term captures the effect of redistribution of spending between
OPEC and the United States. The fourth term is the same as before.
To obtain the effect of an oil shock on the exchange rate, we simply
equate the right-hand sides of equations (9) and (11), and solve for V.
- V, n r, dB°G i, o Ax dB°, (1/) y = — I 7T>^ — TTr^ ) i ~ ( ~ ~~
V / A V vJ Kj / -mr- / T 7" A XGIV A
v
 u ^' XGIV
XGIV
Since the effect of changes in flows of interest income is exactly the
same as that of capital movements we may also use equation (12) to
establish the long-run effect of a wealth transfer to OPEC. The main
point to be noted is that the long-run effect of capital flows is the opposite
of the short-run effect: if the dollar appreciates in the short run because of
capital inflow into the United States, it must depreciate in the long run
because there will be an increase in the outflow of interest income.
Krugman assumes that xrg = 1 and TIG = 0, in which case equation (11)
becomes:
(13) dBG = - a OPO Po + dCF°G IV
+ TT°G(O Po Po - dCF°G IV - dCF°A).278 Paul Krugman
The only secondary effect that is taken into account is the increase in
OPEC imports from Germany, given by the third term.
Average versus Marginal Spending Propensity and Nontraded Goods
How restrictive or misleading is Krugman's simplification? This is
obviously an empirical question, but we may note one or two points to
clarify the issue. It is, of course, true that U.S. average propensity to
spend on domestic output is much greater than German average propen-
sity to spend on U.S. output. But what matters for the absence of
distribution effects is not the difference in average spending propensities
but rather in marginal spending propensities. A simple demand system
that would explain large differences in average spending propensities
with identical marginal spending propensities would be:
(14) If = (CA - CA)"
A (CG - CG)
 WG,
where TTA + TTG = 1 and / = A, G. In this example the United States and
Germany have different consumption preferences, as captured by differ-
ences in CA and C'G. However, world demand for German output is
independent of the distribution of income between the two countries and
would not be affected by transfer payments between them.
The second point that I want to raise in this context has to do with
nontraded goods. It is generally accepted that transfer payments between
countries will change the relative price between traded and nontraded
goods. Increase in export revenue in the OPEC countries, and in the
Netherlands, Norway, and the United Kingdom, or indeed, for a differ-
ent reason, in Australia which is experiencing a boom in the minerals
sector, will lead to an increase in the relative price of nontraded goods in
those countries. This relative price adjustment can be achieved either
through domestic inflation or currency appreciation, or some combina-
tion of the two. In the "paying countries" the oil transfer will lead to a
decline in the relative price of nontraded goods.
Changes in the relative price between traded and nontraded goods will
not, however, have the same international distribution effects as changes
in the international terms of trade since both gainers and losers are in the
domestic economy.
The existence of nontraded goods is, nevertheless, relevant in analyz-
ing the effect of transfer payments on the international terms of trade as
well. Equality of marginal spending patterns on traded goods is no longer
a sufficient condition for zero distribution effects. The reason is that a
transfer payment (such as an increase in the cost of oil imports) will
change the relative price between traded and nontraded goods, as dis-
cussed above, and therefore will have a secondary effect on the demand
for, and the supply of, traded goods. If these secondary effects are biased,279 Oil Shocks
an international transfer payment will have an effect on the international
terms of trade as well.
Determinants of Capital Movements and the Current Account
Why does an increase in the price of imported oil lead to a surplus in
OPEC's current account, and an equal deficit in the combined current
account of the oil importing countries? In a partial equilibrium model a la
Krugman, the answer is obvious since the current account and the capital
account are determined independently of one another.
In a properly specified general equilibrium model, the current account
and the capital account are, however, jointly determined, and a transfer
payment will have a primary effect on both sides of the balance of
payments.
Jeffrey Sachs, among others, has argued that a permanent transfer
payment should have no effect on the current account because the
propensity to consume out of permanent income should be equal to one.
This proportion is not quite right, however, as Lars Svensson and Nancy
Marion have pointed out. First of all, the marginal propensity to consume
out of permanent income is equal to one only in very special cases. Thus,
suppose that the intertemporal utility function is of the form U{CX) + [1 /
(1 + p)]V(C2). With the rate of interest equal to r, the optimal intertem-
poral consumption pattern equates marginal utility of today's consump-
tion with discounted marginal utility of tomorrow's consumption:
U'(CX) = [(1 + r)/(l + p)]V"(C2). From this first-order condition the
effect of a permanent increase in income on first-period consumption is
equal to (2 + r)/(l + a + r), where a = ^"(C1)/t/'(QV^"(C2V^' (Q) is
the ratio of the elasticities of the marginal utility schedules in the two
periods. Therefore, marginal propensity to consume out of permanent
income is greater than, equal to, or less than one depending on whether a
is greater than, equal to, or less than one.
To get back to the problem of OPEC surpluses, we can explain them
with this sort of a model if the marginal utility of current consumption is
more elastic with respect to an increase in consumption than is the case
with future consumption, in other words, if there are "absorption prob-
lems" in the short run.
The marginal utility of consumption of traded goods depends in general
on the available supply of nontraded goods. Thus the difference in
elasticities could be the result of a difference in the supply of nontraded
goods between the present and the future.
Another issue that I want to mention concerns the allocation of OPEC
investments between different countries. Ultimately, the only reason
why OPEC invests abroad is that it wants to import more in the future and
less at the present time. Corresponding to each outflow of capital is an
implicit plan to import goods and services in the future. This means that280 Paul Krugman
the allocation of "oil deficits" between various oil importing countries
should correspond to the pattern of future surpluses, which in part
depends on the relative abilities of countries to satisfy OPEC demand in
the future. A country that cannot increase its supply of tradable goods in
the future should not be running a deficit in its current account at the
present time.
Krugman assumes that asset preferences are determined indepen-
dently of future spending patterns, and thus there is no relationship in his
model between today's current account deficits and tomorrow's current
account surpluses. Furthermore, he assumes that interest rates are zero
so that OPEC investments are pure transfer payments to the deficit
countries. This assumption simplifies the dynamic analysis because the
long-run equilibrium exchange rate does not depend on the capital
account. But it surely is not an assumption that we want to make in
today's economic environment.
Effect of OPEC Surpluses on Interest Rates
It is commonly argued that because OPEC's propensity to save is
greater than that of oil consuming countries, an increase in the price of oil
leads to an excess of saving over investment and therefore to a reduction
in the rate of interest.
This proposition is, in general, incorrect. The error in the reasoning is
the implicit assumption that OPEC surpluses are evidence of a higher
marginal saving propensity. As was shown above, this need not be the
case: a permanent transfer between oil consuming countries and OPEC
will reduce saving in oil consuming countries and increase it in the OPEC
countries without necessarily any change in total world saving. This
would happen if the a parameters discussed above were equal and less
than one in both regions.
Concluding Remarks
The above remarks have discussed the problem of oil price increases
from the point of view of transfer theory. The main message is that oil
transfers need not have any effect on international terms of trade or on
international interest rates. The income effects which Krugman largely
assumes away may be sufficient to induce appropriate adjustments in
spending in the various regions to enable OPEC both to consume and to
save more at unchanged international relative prices.
There will, of course, always be important changes in domestic relative
prices and real wages in each country. The discussion of these adjustment
problems, as well as of the inflationary impact of oil shocks is, however,
beyond the scope of this comment.281 Oil Shocks
Comment Charles Wilson
Krugman's paper effectively demonstrates the importance of examining
the implications of the asymmetry in the location of OPEC's exports,
imports, and foreign investment for exchange rate dynamics. Although it
might be desirable to relax the strictly partial equilibrium assumptions
about the current account and to incorporate a less naive portfolio
theory, the primary point of the paper is still valid. Namely, that if there is
a lag in the adjustment of OPEC expenditures to its revenues, then
differences in OPEC's propensity to invest in one country relative to their
propensity to import from that country may lead to differences in the
direction of exchange rate movements between the short run and the long
run. Krugman examines the case of an oil price increase in some detail. I
would like to examine some possible implications of his model for ex-
change rate movements during the course of a worldwide recession.
Throughout I will follow Krugman in assuming that a, the proportion of
OPEC wealth invested in marks, is less than CT, the proportion of OPEC
oil purchased by Germany, is less than 7, the proportion of OPEC
expenditure on German products.
Suppose, first of all, that we model a world recession as merely a
temporary decrease in the demand for oil. Assuming that demand falls by
the same proportion in each country, the analysis is exactly parallel to the
case of a temporary increase in the price of oil. A decrease in oil revenue
of AO reduces German expenditure on oil by aAO and reduces OPEC
investment in oil by aAO. The net demand for marks thus increases by
(CT - a) AO resulting in an appreciation of the mark. Over time, however,
OPEC expenditure falls. For each unit decrease in expenditure this
results in a decrease in the demand for marks of 7 which is only partially
offset by an increased investment in marks of a. At some point the
decrease in expenditure AE is just large enough so that
(CT - a)AO + (7 - a)AE = 0. Given the mark has already appreciated, so
that the trade balance with the United States has deteriorated, the mark
must be depreciating at this point. It will continue to depreciate until the
economy recovers and the demand for oil returns to its initial level.
When the economy does recover, the impact on the direction of the
exchange rate movement depends on the current value of the mark as
well as the current level of OPEC expenditure. Suppose the mark is at or
above its initial value. Then the German trade account with the United
States will be no higher than it was initially, and since OPEC expenditure
is now less than OPEC revenues, the assumption that a<cr implies that
OPEC will also demand fewer marks than it did initially. Hence the mark
will depreciate. The depreciation must persist as long as the mark exceeds
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its initial value, rising only to the long-run level as expenditure rises to
match revenue. If the recession is very long-lived, however, so that the
value of the mark is less than its initial value, then it may begin appreciat-
ing immediately to the long-run value. In either case, the pattern is for the
mark rate to appreciate, then depreciate, then appreciate again to its
initial value.
A very different pattern emerges if we suppose that OPEC expenditure
is actually a function of its wealth and that the impact of a recession on
OPEC wealth has a significant effect on its expenditure. For concreteness
suppose that there are two assets in each country, money and real capital.
Americans hold only their own capital, in addition to the money hold-
ings. OPEC allocates a fraction a of its wealth into German assets and the
rest into American assets. A certain fraction of its assets in each country
are then held in the form of real capital.
If we suppose that the value of real capital adjusts to the value of its
discounted returns, then a recession will lower the value of the capital
stock owned by OPEC. There will be a shift in OPEC's portfolio away
from currency and into real capital to maintain its portfolio balance, but
so long as the same percentage of its assets in any country are held in real
capital, there will be no change in the excess demand for the aggregate
stock of German assets. Otherwise, a discrete change in the exchange
rate will be required to maintain portfolio balance.
If we suppose that the level of OPEC expenditure depends on the level
of wealth, however, then there will be an additional effect on the flow
demand for marks. A reduction expenditure and hence an increase in
investment by an amount AX will decrease the demand for marks by
(y — a)A^, since the propensity to invest in German assets is less than the
propensity to spend on German goods. As we noted above, a decrease in
oil revenues of AO increases the demand for marks by (a - a)A0, since
the proportion of oil revenues sold to Germany is greater than OPEC's
propensity to invest in German assets. Assuming that 7>cr, however, if
the decline in A^is at least as large as the decline in 0, then the net effect
on the demand for marks will be negative and the mark will begin to
depreciate. >
The exact time path of the exchange rate will then depend to a large
extent on how the value of real capital changes over time. Suppose, for
instance, that the drop in OPEC expenditure exactly equals the fall in oil
revenue. Then there will be no change in OPEC wealth as long as the
value of real capital does not change. The mark will then depreciate until
the trade balance with the United States grows sufficiently to offset the
fall in the trade balance with OPEC. As we near the end of the recession,
however, we might expect the real value of capital to rise in anticipation
of higher future returns, even while the demand for oil stays depressed.
This would generate an increase in OPEC expenditure and, by our283 Oil Shocks
previous assumptions, a net increase in the demand for marks. The
resulting appreciation of the mark might then result in the mark actually
overshooting its long-run value.
To summarize, the impact of decreased business activity in the indus-
trialized countries on exchange rate movements will depend critically on
how sensitive the level of OPEC expenditure is to its level of wealth. If
expenditure merely adjusts to OPEC revenues with a lag, then we should
expect to see the values of the mark first rise and then fall during the
course of a recession. If, however, the decline in OPEC wealth induces a
significant decrease in its expenditure, then the opposite pattern will
emerge. First the mark will depreciate and then appreciate, perhaps even
overshooting its long-run value.